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Fast Learning in Organizations
Andreas Blume




This paper explores how efficiency structures language. It starts
from the premise that one of language's central characteristics is to
provide a means for saying novel things about novel circumstances,
its creativity. As such it is a metaphor for the choice of organiza-
tional forms that can cope with a changing environment. It is shown
how creative language use is achieved via reliance on common knowl-
edge structures,even ifthose structures are consistent with an a priori
absence of a common language. Journal of Economic Literature Clas-
sification Number: C72.
KevwoR~s: Language, Coordination, Optimal Learning, Common
Knowledge, Group Theory
' This paper was begun while I enjoyed the hospitality o( the MEllS department at
Northwestern University. The first version was completed at the CentER [or Economic
Research at Tilburg University. I am grateful to David Austen-Smith, Eddie Dekel, Ogus
Durumeric, Ehud Kalai, Bart Lipman, Alejandro Manelli and Roger Myerson íor helpful
discussions and to Vince Crawford, Hans Haller and Joel Sobel [or comments. I have
benefitted from comments by seminar participants at the CentER for Economic Research
(Tilburg University), CREED (University of Amsterdam), University of BieleÍeld, Hum-
boldt University, University of Saatbrucken, and the SAET conterence in Antalya.
Drug firms need to get their inventions on to the market quickly. That is
easier when researchers and factory designers talk to each other. ... As
competition grows even more fierce, more companies may try lo make
sure that their boffins and (actory designers talk to each other early on.
For the money it saves, it might even be worth paying tor an interpreter.
('Che Economist, November 9th 1996]
1 Introduction
"This paper explores how efficiency structures language. It starts írom the
premise that one of language's central characteristics is to provide a means
for saying novel things about novel circumstances, its creativity (e.g. Aitchi-
son [1993]). As such it is a metaphor for the choice of organizational forms
that can cope with a changing environment.
We are looking for structure in the mode of acquisition of a lexicon. The
structure arises in the form of an optimal learning rule in a coordination
game that is played over time. Initially the players' ability to coordinate
is limlted by an absence of a common language. A language is developed
over the course of the game via observations of past play. The players'
attainable strategies are constrained by how far their language has evolved
at each point. How fast the language evolves depends on which equilibrium
in attaínable strategies is played. The primary aim of the paper is to show
that a priori absence of a common language does not preclude rapid learning
and creative use of language.
Two interpretations for the origins of efficient structures are available,
an evolutionary or learning interpretation and a mechanism design interpre-
tation.t Under the former there is evolutionary pressure on behaviors that
depend on factors that are constant across novel circumstances. Since in
each novel situation, the novelty is dealt with by learning, a complete model
along these lines would be one of learning how to learn. The mechanism
design interpre[ation on the other hand asks directly for learning rules that
cope efficiently with novelty.
In our model the origin of fast learning and creative use of language
is structure in the prior beliefs. This structure itself does not constitute a
common language, as words in the lexicon need not have an a priori meaning,
but may facilitate the acquisition of a lexicon once certain parameters are
determined via observations made by the players over the course of the game.
We will capture novelty oí a set of objects, tasks, types, messages etc.
~ Rubinstein [1996] calls the designer of a such a mechanism a"linguistic engineer."
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via an aósence of a common description of that set. On occasion only some
aspects of a set need to be novel. Then those aspects will lack a common
description while others may have a common description.
Let S2 be a finite set and let us try to be explicit about players' de-
scriptions of that set and about what players know about each others' de-
scriptions. We will follow Crawford and I[aller's [1990] (CH in the sequel)
suggestion that descriptions of S2 be permutations of the set f2 itself, and
that in case players are ignorant about another player's description they
have a uniform belief over alternative permutations. In the case where S2
is part of the description of a game, this approach permits us to model the
absence of a common description in a standard Hayesian game setting.
Part of our intention in this paper is to point out that absence of a com-
mon description of certain elements in a game is compatible with a rich set
of optimal learning rules. The key to our results is a careful reexamina[ion
of CH's notion of absence of a common language. They effectively assumed
that all permutations of the set !2 are equally likely.2 In that case a com-
mon language can be learned only very slowly, observation by observation.
However, there are a great many coordination problems in which there is no
scope for coordination on a priori grounds, and yet learning can take place
very rapidly. Also there are a great many coordination problems in which
it is imperative that a rich language be learned as opposed to just a single
action being identified.
To us, following CH's approach, absence of a common description means
that no subset of S2 is distinguished by the common-knowledge distribution
y5 over the set of descriptions that expresses the players' uncertainty. If
all descriptions are possible and all descriptions are equally likely, then we
have indeed absence of a common description. Equal probabiGty we clearly
cannot dispense with. However, it is less obvious that we need to invoke
a!! possible descriptions of a set. A five-element set can be ranked in 120
~This is the assumption used in the body of CH's paper. In the appendix they consider
a more general formulation that is compatible with the approach in the present paper.
There the extent of a common description o( I1 is expressed via a partition of f2, with
absence of a common description captured by the trivial partition. The partition is refined
as a function of the history of play, where a very general form of history dependence is
possible. CFí do not dosely investigate the relation between histories and partitions. For
ezample, for two elements of S2 not to be commonly distinguished it must be the case that
the partitions they induce, if we exchange them in otherwise ídentical histories, must be
identical up to symmetry. The approach of the present paper ensures that this is the case,
in a setting where beliefs are expressed as permutations of the analyst's ranking of the
elements o( ft.
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different ways. We want to suggest in [his paper that absence of a common
description can be expressed by nontrivial subsets of the set of 120 descrip-
tions. In the next section we will give examples to suggest that often such
subsets are more natural than the entire set of possible permutations.
Clearly, not every subset of the set of permutations will be a candidate
for expressing absence of a common language. A singleton set for example
expresses the exact opposite, a language in which each element can be dis-
tinguished. Less trivially, the candidate set may have properties that allow
the players to use introspection to further reduce the set. The first major re-
sult of the paper (Proposition 1) is a characterization of sets of permutations
that do not allow inferences that would further reduce the set. Irreducibility
of a set of perrnutations turns out to be equivalent to requiring the set to
form a permutation group, a subgroup of the symmetric group of all permu-
tations of S2, denoted by Sn. This is quite natural given that irreducibility
expresses symmetry among the permutations in the set; no subset can be
singled out. Groups are the way to express symmetry in mathematics, e.g.
the symmetries of a ge~~~,etric figure.
Irreducibility of the set of descriptions in the support of the players' be-
liefs is necessary but not sufficient for "absence oí a common description."
Again, a singleton is irreducible; if we make it the standard description, a
singleton becomes the identíty, a trivial group. Absence of a common de-
scription requires not only that one cannot make distinctions among the
descriptions in the support of the players belieís but also that this set of de-
scriptions does not distinguish among the elements of R itself. Such distinc-
tions arise naturally because every group that acts on S2 induces a partition
of S2. Only if our group of descriptions induces a trivial partition, composed
only of S2 itself, do we say that the set of descriptions satisfies "absence of a
common description."
If the set S2 is part of the description of a game, then it is likely that the
players over the course of the game make observations about f2. We identify
such observations as subsets of f2 and note that they introduce distinctions
among the elements of S2. At the very least the observed subset becomes
distinct from its complement but in general (this is the point of this paper)
there will be further distinctions. These additional distinctions arise because
an observation singles out not only a subset of S2 but also a subset of the
set of descriptions of S2; roughly, it focusses on all those descriptions that
describe the observation in a particular way (e.g. if the observation is a
singleton, it may pick all those descriptions that assign rank one to the
observation).
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One yuestion that arises in this context is whether the set of descriptions
that are selected by an obsen.ation is again irreducible. 'rhat this is indeed
the case is shown in Proposition 2.
The set of all descriptions of a set ft satisfies irreducibility and absence
of a common description. Learning in this environment is slow because at
each step only the observation itself becomes identified. The yuestion arises
then whether there are other sets of description that satisfy irreducibility
and absence of a comrnon description and can be learned faster. Proposítion
a takes a first look at this question. lt deals with observations that are pairs
of elements of S2. This would be appropriate for example in a two player co-
ordination game in which the positions of the players are not distinguished.
Proposition 3 shows that for any finite set 52 [here exists a group character-
ized by absence of a common description such that for large f2 altnost every
observation of a pair of elernents of !2 induces a cornmon description of all
of f2. If we apply this to repeated coordination games, then two differences
with CH emerge in this case: (1) Typically coordination will be achieved in
the second round, and (2) whenever coordination is achieved, then at the
same time all other actions become identified. The la[ter is inconsequential
in repeated coordination games but can easily become essential once we look
at other classes of coordination problems.
Proposition 9 shows that in some sense the fast learning phenomenon
identified in Proposition 3 is ubiquitous. Every subgroup of .Ssz can be
learned faster than the symmetric group.
"I'he remaining two results examine the nature and cariety of fast learn-
ing. Proposition S shows that there are definite restrictions on the form
that opt.imal learning can take if we represent players' uncertainty through
permutations. In general one can rule out learning paths in which for a
while only the observations themselves become identified and then suddenly
all elements of S2 become identified. Therefore, in general, fast learning witl
involve observations that identify more than the observation itself but less
than all of the elements of S2.
The final result, Proposition 6, shows that for any lower bound on the
size of 4, there is a rich set of groups representing absence of a common de-
scriplion that can be learned with any prespecified number of observations.
t
2 Strategies, Games and Examples
This section recalls and generalizes the definition oí an attainable strategy.
It then discusses a series of different coordination games to motivate optimal
learning and to demonstrate the role of fast learning.
If we take 12 as part of the description of a game, it might represent ac-
tions of players, some part of their private information, or even the players
themselves. Strategies, as usual, are functions that map the players' infor-
mation into their actions. Thus f2 might be either part of the domain or of
the range of these functions; there might even be multiple sets S2~ represent-
ing different aspects of the environment for which the players lack a common
language description. The fact that players lack a common language descrip-
tion of f2, formally appears as a restriction on their beliefs. Given his own
description, a player's strategy is unrestricted. However, since a common
knowledge description is not available, the other players' beliefs assign equal
probability to all strategies of a player that differ only in the treatment of
elements of S2 LLat are not commonly dietinguished.
This approach permits us to model the absence of a common description
in a standard Bayesian game setting. Players' descriptions are drawn from
a common-knowledge distribution ~ on the set of possible descriptions of f2,
where we take this set as the set of permutations of the elements of f2. The
description drawn by a player becomes that players' private information.
Absence of a common language description means that players' strategies
depend on their private information only in a restricted sense. Say, a player
has a certain strategy given one description; then his strategy in terms of
another description is exactly the same, conditional on the description (e.g.
the j's action in one description plays exactly the same role as the j's action
in another description).
A player's strategy may wel] depend in great detail on the set S2. How-
ever from the perspective of the other players it can only depend on those
aspects of St that have a common description. If therefore we adopt the
convention that a player's strategy expresses the beliefs other players hold
about her (see Rubinstein [1991]) then lack of common describability can be
expressed in terms of restrictions on players' strategies. Therefore we call a
strategy attainable for a player if it satisfies the condition that he random-
izes uniformly over all pure strategies that differ only in the treatment of
elements of 52 that are not cornmonly distinguished.
Among the attainable strategy profiles we are interested in those that
maximize the players' ex ante payoff. These we call optima! attainable stmte-
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gies. tiote that we deliberately ignore higher order coordination problems
that may arise if there are multiple optimal attaínable strategies. In the
spirit of the introduction we think of those multiplicities as being elimi-
nated either by evolutionary pressures or by Rubinstein's [1996~ "linguistic
engineer."
Next we discuss three motivating examples.
2.1 Repeated Coordination Games
Here we recapitulate a central insight from the work of Crawford and }Ialler.
Consider the following game played on a finite set f2: Each of two players
chooses one element of f2 simultaneously and independently. If both make
identical choices, then their payoffs equal 1, otherwise their payoffs are equal
to 0. Let. this game be repeated infinitel-v oíten, and let repeated game
payoffs be equal to the discounted sum of stage game payoffs, with a discount
factor 0 C ó C 1. Let the players' uncertainty be represented by a uniform
distribution over all possible permutations of the analyst's description of S2.
Also, let the players' positions be not distinguished, which forces them to
use identical strategies. Then, as shown by C}}:
1. [f ~S2 - 2, then there is an essentially unique optimal attainable
strategy. In the first stage absence of a common description requires
that players randomize uniformly over their two actions. In subsequent
stages,if players have not yet succeeded to coordinate, they switch
their action in each period with probability one half. Once players
achieve coordination in some period, they can maintain coordination in
subsequent periods by simply continuing to use the same action (here
we have inessential nonuniqueness because once actions are identified,
there are many ways of sustaining cooperation).
2. With ~ft ~ 6 the following is an optimal attainable strategy, quoting
CH: "Play each of your actions with equal probability in the first stage.
If coordination results, maintain it by repeating your first-stage action.
If not, rule out all of your actions but yout first-stage action and the
action that would have yielded coordination, given your partner's first-
stage action. Then play the resulting 2 x 2 game using your part of
its optimal attainable combination."
Note that the expected coordination time is t~ 2, that coordination
sometimes will take a long time, and that even if coordination is achieved
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the players are in general far írom having developed a common language.
In that sense the optimal coordination process is slow and ot limited scope.
For the game at hand the limited scope is of no consequence, however in
other contexts learning a common language fully may be essential.
2.2 A Rudimentary Grammar
Consider the following game played repeatedly between two players, a sender
and a receiver. At the beginning of the game the sender learns his private
information and sends a message to the receiver. Upon receiving the message
the receiver takes an action. Payofís depend only on the sender's private
information, his type, and the receiver's action.3 The payoff to both players
is one if the receiver's action matches the sender's type and zero otherwise.
There is exactly one matching action for each type of the sender. Messages
do not affect payoffs directly. Assume that after each round the players
commonly observe the type drawn for that round, the message sent in that
raund, und the action taken The sender's pilvate information is determined
anew in each round according to a uniform distribution.
Additional structure is provided by types and messages being strings.
To simplify the discussion let types be triples formed by permutations of
the letters A, B and C, e.g. (B, C, A), and let messages be triples as well,
formed by permutations of ~, ~ and ót. To rule out a prtiori focal points we
will take this to be the analyst's description and assume that for each player
there exists a private set of six symbols, taking the roles of A, B,C,., ~ and
Ra, not known to the other player." Now assume that either through prior
experience with a similar environment or handed down by the linguistic
engineer the players have a common knowledge ranking of permutations
of three objects; i.e., given a particular ordered triple of objects, they can
generate a common-knowledge sequence of all six ordered triples of those
objects.
The first time the game is played, the sender and the receiver lack a
common-knowledge description of the types space and of the message space.
According to our definition of attainable strategy, each type randomizes
uniformly over all messages and the probability of a matching action being
taken is 1~6. In the following round however each player, in terms of his own
representation, has observed two triples and constructed two corresponding
'Wárneryd [1993], Blume, Kim and Sobel [1993] and Blume [1996] consider the evolu-
tion of ineaning of a prion meaningless messages in sender receiver games.
~The focal point notion was first proposed by Schelling [1960].
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common knowledge rankings of those triples. Thus every t,vpe and every
message has become identified, meaning that there is an attainable strategy
guaranteeing successful communication in the second round and thereafter.
Crucial here is access to a common knowledge rule for generating permu-
tations of triples. This in effect puts the elements of the type set like beads
on a circle with an orientation; once the initial bead is fixed, the rank of
all other beads is determined. The initial uncertainty about the 6-element
type (message) set is then represented by a particular cyclic subgroup of the
symmetric group S6. Finally, note that the cornmon knowledge rule can be
interpreted as implementing a very simple and natural (common knowledge)
rule that uses the first observation to generate a bijec[ion between the sets
{A,B,C} and {.,~,8t}.
Contrary to the first example, coordination is guaranteed from the sec-
ond period on and a complete common language is learned. Moreover players
use their language creatively in that in the second period they are likely to
indicate a novel type (not observed before) via a novel message (not sent
before). Batali [1996] has referred to similar structures as grammars, em-
phasized the ro}e of such grammars for the expression of novel meanings and
inquired into the evolution of such grammars.
2.3 Coordination on Spheres
The following example combines features of the first two and also indicates
how the linguistic engineer could be dispensed with. Let S2 be the set of
points on a sphere (with no further distinctions among those points). In
each pcriod two agents are chosen to play a repeated game on the sphere.
Each period is divided into rounds. In each round, the two chosen agents
simultaneously and independently pick a location on the sphere. Once both
players have made their choices, the choices are revealed to the agents.
If the locations picked are the same, then their payoff in that round is
one, otherwise, it is zero. In each period the two chosen agents receive the
discounted sum of their payoffs from each round. In the following period a
new pair of agents is drawn from the population and the same game is played
with those two agents on a new sphere. F,ach pair of agents can observe all
the choices made by their predecessors on their respective spheres.
The game played within a period is quite similar to the game played
in our first example. It is a repeated coordination game. The probabil-
ity of coordination in the first round equals zero, the same as the limit of
first-round coordination probabilities in the first example if we let the num-
u
ber of locations go to infinity. However, there exists an optimal attainable
strategy that guarantees coordination in the second round (and thereafter)
with probability one. One such strategy prescribes that in the second round
the players choose the midpoint of the shortest distance between their first-
round choices. This midpoint is almost always well defined, the exception
being antipodal first-period location choices.
L;nlike in the first example we can guarantee coordination in the sec-
ond round. As in the second example this is due to the common-knowledge
structure, here oí the space of locations. Once we speak of a sphere, we
implicitly Gmit the set of permutations of locations to be considered to mo-
tions, those are all permutations of points on the sphere that leave distances
invariant.
The repetition of the repeated coordínation game serves only to illustrate
how one may think of dispensing with the linguistic engineer. If we think
of agents in diflerent periods as experimenting with different strategies, and
adopting strategies that were successful for their predecessors, we may well
expect convergence to an optimal attainable strategy over time.
3 Irreducibility of Descriptions
In this section we formulate a desideratum for irreducibility oí a set of de-
scriptions of a finite set S2 and show that a set of descriptions satisfying
this condition must be a subgroup of the symmetric gtoup Sp. Let ~S2 - n
and let H be a set of rankings of the elements of S2; i.e., each h E H is a
bijection la : SZ ~{1,2,...,n}. It is without loss of generality to identify the
set S2 with { 1, 2, ..., n} (and we will do so freely in the sequel), in which case
each h: S2 -- S2 becomes a permutation of St. Furthermote, it is without
loss of generality to choose the analyst's labelings such that they correspond
to one of the rankings; i.e., 3e E H such that e(w) - w,dw E f2. That is,
from the analyst's perspective we can make one of the rankings the stan-
dard. Concerning permutations, the standard is then expressed in terms
of itself simply via the identity function e(-). All this means is that we can
choose one of the rankings considered possible by the agents as the standard
ranking.
However, it is very important to emphasize that we do not want the
agents to be able to single out particular rankings by introspection. This re-
quires that the agents do not know the analyst's ranking. But it also requires
that rankings are essentially indistinguishable. No matter which standard
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we choose, the set of rankings H expressed in terms of that standard must
always be the same.
Suppose for example that we replace the current standard ranking b,y an
alternative ranking g E H. In that case an object that was originally labeled
w is now labeled w' - g(W). We can then express all other rankings, f, in
terms of the new standard, i.e.
f(~) - I a g-'(~ ).
Thus Jog-t ( or abbreviated fg-t) becomes the new representation of what
used to be the ranking f.s
Our condition that the set of rankings H not change if we choose a
particular one as the standard then amounts to requiring that
{fg-t~f E H} - If Vg E H,
or in abbreviated form
(IA) Hg-t - H dg E H.
We will refer to this condition as the irreducibility axiom (IA). If the players'
uncertainty over the description used by the other players is expressed in
terms of H, then the irreducibility axiom guarantees that the players cannot
introspectively reduce their uncertainty by adopting one particular standard
from the set of all possible standards.
The irreducibility axiom imposes a strong condition on sets of possible
descriptions. The implications of imposing IA are explored in the following
simple result. This proposition characterizes irreducible sets of descriptions
as permutation groups. For that purpose recall that a group G consists of
a set (here the set of permutations), an operation ," o", on the set (here
composition of permutations) such that for all J,g, h E G, (i) the associative
law holds ( f o(g o h) -(J o g) o h); (ii) there exists an identity element e
such that e o g- g- g o e; and (iii) for all g E G there exists an inverse g-t
with g o g-t - e- g-t o g.
One group that is of particular interest to us is the set of all permutations
of elements of the set 4, denoted b,y Sp. This group is referred to as the
symmetric group on S2. If G is a group and H is a subset of G, then H is
'Note that we adopt the convention that permutations "act on the left," i.e. whenever
we compose permutations, Lhe rightmost in the product is per(ormed first, followed by its
neighbor on thc le([ and so on.
l~
a subgroup of G, denoted II ~ C, if H contains the identity, and is closed
under taking inverses and under the group operation.
Proposition 1 A set of descriptions H of a set S2 satisfies the irreducibitity
ariam ~IA) if and only if H is a subgroup of the symmetric group S~.
Proof: Consider necessity first. (i) (existence of the identity). Earlier we
found it convenient to simply assume that e E H. I{owever, this is also
implied by (IA) because Hg-~ - H and g E H together imply that e-
gg-~ E H. (ii) (existence of an inverse) Hg-1 - H and e E H together
imply that g-1 - eg-I E H. (iii) (composition of permutations in H defines
an operation on fI) (Ilg-~ - H,Vg E H) and (g-1 E H,Vg E H) implies
that Hg - f1,Vg E H from which it follows that fg E H,b'f,g E H. (iv)
(associative law) associativity is inherited from S~. Conversely, if H is a
permutation group, then since H is closed under the group operation, we
have Hg C fl,bg E I~. Since e E II, this implies that flg - H,Vg E H, and
in conjunction with g-' E H,dg E H, we also have Hg-t - II,Ftg E X. O
4 A Priori Distinctions
The agents may a priori be able to commonly distinguish some subset 0 C
S2 from other subsets of f2. If we express the agents' beliefs via a set of
possible descriptions, H, then H must reftect the agents' ability to make
such common distinctions. This is indeed the case because H associates a
set of possible labels with each element w E f2. Points w for which these
sets of labels diHer írom each other can be commonly distinguished by the
agents. To make all this precise, it is useful to introduce the notion of a
group G acting on a nonempty set S2. For each w E S2 and for each g E G,
define an element g(w) E ft. Then the group G acts on S2 if
(~) e(w) - w dw E 52, and
(ii) h(9(w)) - h9(w) Vw E S2, and V g,h E G.
In our case, we are only interested in permutation groups, G c Sn and
their "natural" group action on f2, where each permutation is viewed as a
function. Given any group G acting on S2, we can associate with any w E 52
the image of w under the group action. Define the orbit of w under G acting
on S2 as
C~(w) -{9(w)~9 E G} C f2.
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Then points w and w' can be distinguished if and only if they belong to
different orbits. In that regard, it is useful to know that the set o[ orbits
forms a partition of f2 (e.g. Rotman [1996], p.122).
5 Absence of a Common Description
We can consider the special case of a single orbit. Then O(w) - Sl Vw E f2.
[n this instance none of the elements of S2 can be distinguished from any
other element of S2. We say then that there is an "absence of a common
description." A group H with only a single orbit is called trnnsitive (e.g.
Dixon and Mortimer [1996], p.8).
6 Observations
For the moment assume that the initial beliefs are characterized by an ab-
sence of a common description of S2, i.e. by a transitive permutation group
acting on S2. We want to examine how the agents can update and coordinate
their beliefs on the basis of observations about f2. The key here is that the
agents can use their observations to label points in S2.
Different labeling rules could arise or be suggested by the linguistic en-
gineer ( "name the first object observed 5," "name it 7"). Note however that
because these rules are distinguishable, agents can arrive at a common rule
by introspection, or if necessary, through repeated encounters of similar sit-
uations. From the analyst's perspective, it is then without loss of generafity
to consider a particular rule. We will adopt the rule that the first element
observed is named "]." And as long as observations do not restrict the man-
ner in which the remaining elements are named, the k-th element observed
is natned "k."
Thus far we have covered the case of singletons observed in sequence. We
can generalize this idea to observations of sets of elements; observation of a
set amounts to simultaneous observation of the points in the set in a manner
that does not permit distinctions among points in the set. Suppose the set
0 C S2, with ~0 - m, is observed initiallys For any such m, 1 C m G n,
consider sets of the form {lr,12,...,lm} with l; E {1,...,n}, and !; ~ h for
61f ~ is an observation, then one may worry whether the agents might not be better
off if they took the set f2 `~ as the basis for their introspection. We will later see that
this is not an issue.
Í2
i~ j. For any fixed na and n consider some arbitrary complete order, r, on
these sets (such that any collection of such sets has a maximal element).
Given the observation of a set 0 C n(expressed in terms of some stan-
dard h E fl), we can find for each g E H the set
09 :- {g(~) E ~~~ E f2}
and construct the collection of sets
C(0) - {Os~g E H}.
From above, C(~) has a Y-maximal element, say 0`; note that in general
there will be multiplc g such that ~9 - 0'. Pick some g' E H such that
0' - ~9~ and reexpress the elements of S2 in terms of g' i e ~' - g"(W)
In terms of these new variables we then have functions g' - gg`-r and
H~ - Hg.-i.
Define the set of permutations
H{o.} - {g' E H'~0'9~ - 0'}.
In group theory, this is referred to as the seiwise stabilizer of the set ~`
(e.g. Dixon and Mortimer [1996], p.13). Intuitively, this is the set of all
descriptions that do no alter the set of labels for elements of ~', where
0' is the observation ~ expressed in terms of the new coordinates. To
summarize, we used the order ~ to pick a set oflabels for the observation
0, identified all permutations which assign the same labels to 0 and used
one of them to define new coordinates. In terms of these new coordinates,
the permutations selected by the observation are the setwise stabilizer of the
observation. At this point, while using the new coordinates, it is convenient
to simply drop al} the s's and primes and to consider
H{o} - {9 E H~0' - 0}.
One checks easily that for any ~, the setwise stabilizer H{p} is a subgroup
of tf. Thus, we have the following result.
Proposition 2 Civen an irreducible set of description H C Sn, an obser-
vation 0 C f2 lnduces an irreducióle set oj descriptions H{o}.
We derived this result under the assumption that H induces a single orbit.
However, it is valid more generally. If 0 is a subset of one of the orbits
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of ff, the preceding argument applies unchanged. If instead ~ intersects
multiple orbits, then each of these int.ersections can be treated as a separate
observation.
At this point it is useful to return to the question of whether agents
might prefer to update the support of their beliefs based on f2 `~ rather
than ~1. For that purpose note that when a group G acts on f2, then each
function g(.) is a bijection since its inverse is simply g-t(-), where g-t is the
inverse of g in the group G. It is easily seen that if each g(-) is a bijection,
then
ff{o} - ff{oc} VO C f2.
7 Learning to Coordinate
The next question we want to address and the centra] theme of this paper
is how hard it typically is to solve two-player coordination problems.
A similar question was posed before by Crawford and Haller [1990]. They
were primarily concerned with a particular form of the absence of a com-
mon description where the players' initial beliefs take the form of a uniform
distribution over all possible permutations.~ In considering this case, they
did not only rule out the possibility ïor a priori coordination, they also,
implicitly, assumed that each observation identified merely the observation
itself, and did not lead to any further differentiation of the set S2. In our
framework this can be accomplished by letting the permutation group G
that expresses the players' initial beliefs simply be equal to the symmetric
group Sn.
One of the central insights of CH's paper dealt with the case with extreme
symmetry, where positions of players were not distinguished which meant
that a player's strategy could not depend on the players identity. They
showed that with sufficiently many actions, there is an essentially unique
optimal way to play a repeated coordination game: In the initial round, each
player's action choice is arbitrary. If the players manage to coordinate in the
first round, they stick to their initial action choices forever after. Otherwise
they randomize uniformly over two actions, their own initial action, and
the action that would have been optimal against the choice of the other
player. Randomization continues until coordination is achieved. Thereafter
the players stick to their coordinating actions.
'In an appendix they consider a general formulation using partitions but do not inves-
tigate optimal learning in this case.
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The optimal coordinating process in the case where the players' uncer-
tainty is expressed as a uniform distribution over all permutations is slow
and limited. Each observation identifies merely the observation itself and
once coordination is achieved, at most three sets of actions are identified,
the coordinating action, the unsuccessful action and the unused actions. In
summary, players start out without a common language and end with a
partially common language that is just rich enough to make coordination
possible. No common distinction among unused messages arises; players do
not use their language creatively.
The introductory examples of a rudimentary grammar and coordination
on spheres show that absence of a common description need not imply that
learning is as slow and limited in scope as in the case where all permutations
are considered. Our next result examines the intuition underlying these
examples formally, in a finite setting.
To state our result we will need a little more group theoretic tenninology.
If g E Sp and w E f2, then we say that g fixes w if g(~) - w; otherwise g
moves ~. Let ~.i~, ...,W, E St, c,,~; ~ wi for 1 G i, j G r, i~ j. If ,q fixes ~i for
7~ 1,.. ,r, and if 9(Wt) -~z,9(WZ) - w3,...,9(W.-i) - w.,9(~r) -~i,
then g is called an r-cycle, and is denoted (~~,w2,...,~,).
Let G be a group and g E C,. If gk - e for some k~ 1, then the
smallest such k is called the order of g. If C is a group and g E G, then
G g~:- {g"~n E~} is the cyclic subgroup of G that is genemted by g.
One convinces oneself easily that if g is an r-cycle, then g has order r and
G g ~- {e,gl, ..,gr-~}.
When positions in a two-player simultaneous-move game are not distin-
guished, then observations of the two players' simultaneous actions are not
distinguished and therefore we must consider the corresponding setwise sta-
bilizers. We will refer to observations of k-element sets as "k-observations."
'I'he next result on the effect of two-observations is applicable Co two-player
games in which players' positions are not distinguished.
Proposition 3 Let G-C g~ where g is an n-cycle and consider the
natural action of G on S2. Then
1. C expresses absence of a common description;
2. iJ n is odd, then every two-observation induces a common description
of all elements of S2; and,
3. áf n ás even, then a proportion "nl of all possible two-observations
induce a common description of all elements of Sl.
1J
Proof: For (1) to hold, G must have a single orbit. The definition of an
n-cyde imp}ies immediately that G does indeed have a single orbit.
For (2) let n be odd and consider, without loss of generality, the two-
observation {w~,wy}. Since g is an n-cycle, e is the unique element h E G
such that h(wt) - wl. To derive a contradiction, suppose that G{{W,.w,}} is




which can be restated as gk-i(w~) - mz and gk-t(w2) - w~. Therefore
gz{k-~}(wy) - wz Let k~ 1 without loss of generality. Then, since g is an n-
cycle by assumption, n must be a divisor of 2(k-!) and since 2(k-1) c 2n,
it must be the case that 2(k -!) - n. This implies that n is even, thus
generating a contradiction. Therefore G{{W,,w,}} must be a singleton.
The argument that we just gave to show that G{{~,,,w,}} must be a sin-
gleton whenever n is odd, dearly does not work for the case where n is even,
and indeed the claim is not true when n is even. However, it remains true
that any two-observation {w~,w2} whose stabilizer is not a singleton satisfies
9' (wt ) - wz~
For all other two-observations of the form {w~, w} with w ~ g~(w~ ), G{{w,,w}}
is a singleton. That is, n-1 out of n two-observations {wl,w} have the prop-
erty that G{{w,,~,}} is a singleton and thus signifies a common description.
0
This proposition deals with a class of subgroups that capture a similar
intuition as "coordination on spheres." This class could be referred to as
"coordination on a directed circle" Note that if S2 represents actions in a
coordination game, then here acquisition of a common language is ( almost
a}ways) assured in the second round and the players achieve a complete com-
mon knowledge description of S2. One difference with the spheres example is
that there second-round coordination can be guaranteed but not a complete
common language labeling of all points on the sphere in the second round.
When positions are distinguished in a two-player simu}taneous-move
game, the two players' simiiltaneous actions become separate singleton ob-
servations. If [he game in question is a simple coordination game and we
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are interested in how players achieve coordination through repeated play,
then learning with distinguished positions is essentially trivial; since posi-
tions are distinguished, we can simply assign the (commonly known) label
"player one" to one of the players. There is then an attainable strategy pro-
file in which player one repeats his first-round action in subsequent rounds
and player two uses a best reply to player one's action in all rounds follow-
ing the first round. This is independent of which subgroup of the symmetric
group .Sn expresses the players' uncertainty at the beginning of the repeated
game.
I,earning with distinguished positions becomes less trivial if we alter the
game. For example, consider a game in which, as before, players receive a
positive payoff if and only if they meet in some location but once a locations
has served as a meeting place it cannot do so again until at least k rounds
have passed, where 1 C k C n- 1. Also, simplify by letting only player one's
action be commonly observable after each round. If the initial uncertainty
is described by Sp, then locations become identified only by player one's
choice of those locations. Successful cnnrdina.tinn nn snme Inr.ation in the
first period, for example, does not guarantee coordination in subsequent
periods because that location cannot be revisited for some time and because
for the other locations any kind of common description is still lacking.
Especially for large n and k, coordination in the initial phase of the
game becomes quite tedious. Consider as an extreme case k- n- 1 then
sustained coordination is possible but in order to achieve it, the players
need to acquire a complete common description of the set of locations f2.
Even if the players cared about nothing else but achieving such a common
description as early as possible, it would still take n- 1 periods. Given, that
players discount the future and given that coordination is a chance event at
any location that is not yet commonly described, the expected time until a
full common description is achieved exceeds n- 1. For example, if agents
do not coordinate in the first period, then discounting will induce them to
both visit player one's first period choice in the second period. Thus, no
new location is identified in the second period.
In this example the full description of S2 is acquired very slowly, one
observation at a time. This contrasts with the case where the initial uncer-
tainty is described by C (w~,w2,...,w„~ 1 and where therefore coordination
can be guaranteed in all rounds but the first round.
For the remainder of the paper we will concentrate on the case of single-
ton observations, as in the example with distinguished positions. Obviously,
it is always the case that a full description of a set S2 with ~S2 - n can be ac-
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quired with no more than n- 1 observations. The example shows that fewer
observations may suffice. Indeed, the tollowing result shows that the case
where n- 1 observations are needed is in a certain sense atypical. When-
ever absence of a common description of an n-element set S2 is captures by
a nontrivial subgroup G of Sp, denoted G G S~, strictly fewer than n- 1
observations are needed to establish a common description of f2.
For the next result, since it is concerned with the accumulation of obser-
vations it will be useful to have ready the definition of the pointwise stabilizer
Gtpl of a set 0(e.g. Dixon and Mortimer [1996], p. ]3):
Gtol -{g E G~~s - ~,,dw E 0}.
Proposition 4 Let ~S2 - n and !et the uncertainty over 52 be described
by the group G G St2. Then f2 can be (earned with strictly less than n- 1
observations.
Proof: If G is not transitive on S2, then we can partition S2 into the orbits
of G on S2 (e.g. Rotman [1996~, p.122). Let there be r~ 1 such orbits and
denote the p's orbit by Oo. Then n- ~o-~ ~(()o). Since each orbit can
be learned with at most ~(f)o) - 1 observations, S2 can be learned with at
most ~o-t(~(pP)-I) - n-robservations. Essentially thesameargument
works if there is a set 0 of ! G n- 1 observations such that the pointwise
stabilizer Glol fails to be transitive.
Consider therefore the case where after any number l C n- 1 of ob-
servations, given by 0, the pointwise stabilizer Glpl remains transitive on
12 `0. We know that in general the following relationship between orbits
and stabilizers holds (e.g. Rotman [1996~, p.123):
~íG~,) - ~(G) V~ E S2.
~d(~) ~
Thus, if G is transitive on f2, we have
~(G~,) - ~~G),Hw E S2.n
As long as after each additional observation the stabilizer remains transitive
on the complement o( the set of observations, it follows by induction that
the pointwise stabilizer of the l-element set ~ satisfies the condition
~k(G o ) - ~(G)( 1 (nJ(n - l)')'
ls
and if we set l- n- l, we have
~k(Glo)) -
~~G)
if 0 is a set of n - 1 consecutive observations. }{owever, we know that
with n- 1 observations ~(Glol) - 1, such that it must be the case that
~(G) - n!. This is only possible if G- Ss) 0
8 Fast Learning with Absence of a Common De-
scription
We are most interested in the case where an a priori absence of a common
description is compatible with fast learning. So far we have shown that fast
learning "is the rule" and that sometimes it can indeed occur in conjunction
with an a priori absence of a common description. One may then be led
t~ the conjecture that there is a rich set of envirnnments ( subgl4ups of Sp)
with such a cooccurrence. This section shows that this conjecture can be
confirmed in a qualified sense.
We will deal with the qualification first. Our first result in this section
focusses on a patticular class of cooccurtences of fast learning and a priori
absence of a common description. These are learning patterns composed
of a period of incremental learning followed by a jump to a full common
description. Our result on this type of learning is essentially negative; there
are definite restrictions on the nature of such cooccurrences. In particular,
we will show that for sufficiently large n and most l G n, there does not
exist a group G G Stz such that S2 can be learned with l observations while
Glpl remains transitive on S2 `t1 for all 0 with ~0 C l.
In order to prove this result we need to introduce a few additional con-
cepts from the theory of permutation groups. Call any 2-cycle a transposi-
tion. One can show ( e.g. Rotman [1996], p.63) that for n 1 2 every g E Ss1
is a product of transpositions. If g can be factored into an even number of
transpositions, then g is called an even permutation. The set of all even per-
mutations in Sn forms a subgroup, An, that is referred to as the alternating
group of degree n.
We also need the concept of a multiply transitive group. If G is a group
acting on 52, one can define an action on S2k by
9(~r,...,mk) - (9(~r)~...,9(~r)).
l9
Consider 521k1, that subset of f2k that is composed of all those k-tuples whose
elements are distinct; S2~kl is G-invariant for all G and for all k. G is called
k-transitive if G is transitive on i2~k1.8
The following facts about k-transitive groups wil] be useful (e.g. Dixon
and Mortimer [1996], p.33, and Wielandt [1964], p.19). For k~ 1, k-
transitivity implies (k - 1)-transitivity. G is k-transitive on f2 if and only
if Gy is (k - 1)-transitive on S2 ~~. G is transitive if and only if it is 1-
transitive. The alternating group An is (~S2 -'l)-transit.ive. Finally, in
addition to these elementary facts about multiply transitive groups, we will
make use of the following result by Wielandt [1960]9:
Theorem 1 ( Wielandt) Let G G Si2 be an 8-transitive group of finite de-
gree. Then G ~ Ap.
Wielandt's proof of this result assumes what is known as the Schreier
Conjecture. The Schreier conjecture in turn can be established via the
classification of finite simple groups. Actually, using this classification one
can strengthen the result further to show that unless a finite permutation
group contains the alternating group, it is at most 5-transitive (e.g. Dixon
and Mortimer [1996], p.218).
Call an observation that identifies only the observed element itself an
incremental observation. At the other extreme are observations that lead
to a simultaneous identification of all the remaining elements of S2; those
observations will be referred to as revealing observations. Note that when
only two elements of S2 remain unidentified, then an additional observation
is automatically revealing. Sa, for example, is learned with n-2 incremental
observations, followed by one revealing observation. If g is an n-cycle, then
G g~ is learned with zero incremental observations and a single revealing
observation.
These two examples represent opposite ends of the spectrum of possible
learning speeds. What about the intermediate ranges of the spectrum?
Consider A4, the alternating group of degree four. If we list each element of
"Multiply transitive groups made an early appearance in game theory in von Neumann
and Morgenstern's [1947] discussion of symmetry in games.
9A statement, proof and discussion of this result can also be found in Dizon and
Mortimer [1996], p.218
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Aq as a permutation of the column vector (1,2,3,4)', then A4 has the form
1 2 3 4 1 l 2 2 3 3 9 4
2 1 4 3 4 3 3 4 2 1 1 2
A4- 3 4 1 2 2 4 1 3 4 2 3 1
4 3 2 1 3 2 4 1 1 4 2 3
If the element ~ with absolute rank 2 is observed, we can first alter the
standard such that this element acquires rank 1 and then focus on those
pertnutations which fix this element. In terms of the original standard, thís





Note that with the exception of element number 2(according to the orig-
inal standard), this collection of descriptions leaves every element uniden-
tified. 'I'he stabilizer of the element "2" is transitive on the complement of
"2;" the observation "2" is incremental. The properties of multiply transitive
groups imply straightforwardly that instead of "2" we could have considered
any other observation and would have obtained the same result. Thus, given
that A4 expresses the players' beliefs, the first observation is incremental.
Note further, that in the induced subgroup only the identity fixes any of the
remaining elements. Therefore, whatever the second observation, it will be
revealing.
In summary, in the case where S2 has four elements, we can find permuta-
tion groups such that all observations are either incremental or revealing and
where either the first observation is revealing (~ g~, where g is a 4-cycle),
the second observations is revealing (A4), or the third observation is reveal-
ing (S4). Conditional on all observations being revealing or incremental, a
four-element set then permits the full range of possibilities. However, as
indicated before, this example is the exception when it comes to exhausting
the possibilities of combining incremental and revealing observations.
If C acting on !2 can be learned with l incremental observations followed
by one revealing one, we say that "S2 can be learned with 1 incremental
observations." We saw that a four-element set could be learned with either
0, 1, or 2 incremental observations; these are all the possibilities since the
(n- 1)st observations is always revealing. According to the next proposition
this state of affairs is quite exceptional.
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Proposition 5 If ~S2 ? 11, then ft r.annot be tearned with I incremental
oóservations whenever 7 G t C~í2 - 4.
Proof: In order to arrive at a contradiction, suppose that ~4 ~ 11 and that
S2 can be learned with ! incremental observations where ! is in the specified
intervaL Then the group G that expresses the players' uncertainty over
f2 must be (! ~ 1)-transitive, i.e. still transitive on the complement of the
observations after ! observations, but not (l f 2)-transitive for otherwise at
least 1 f 1 observations are needed to learn R. Thus, if l ~ i, then G must be
8-transitive and therefore by Wielandt's theorem (Theorem 1), G contains
the alternating group. But then C is (~S2 - 2)-transitive and therefore the
pointwise stabilizer of a set 0 with no more than ~S2 - 3 elements is still
transitive on S2 `~, contrary to the assumption that the I-{- lst observation
is revealing (which is part of the assumption that S2 can be learned with l
incremental observations). 0
Note that since Theorem 1 can be strengthened, the bounds on "learning
with 1 incremental observations" could be tightened as well.
Despite the last result, one can show that there is indeed a large set of
scenarios in which an a priori absence of a common description is compatible
with the possibility of fast learning. Of course, the previous result tells us
that incremental observations do not play an important role in such learn-
ing. Most observations will be "partially revealing," i.e. besides identifying
the observed ob ject itself, they introduce identifying distinctions among the
other objects that have not yet been observed.
Definition 1 A group G G Sp can be learned in k steps if Gl~ ~ e, ~ E
S2k-~ and 3G; E!2k such that Gl~,l - e
The following result shows that for any k and any lower bound on the
size of 4 there is always an St and a subgroup of Sp that acts transitively
on S2 and can be learned in k steps.
Proposition 8 Farany numóer of steps, k, and any lower bound ! on ~52,
there always exists a set S2 and a group G ~ Sn that acts transitively on ft
and can fie learned in k steps.
Proof: het n - k x!, and for any subset h~ of Sp call the smallest subgroup
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of Sa containing K the group generuted 6y lí . Consider the group H G S„
that is generated by the ("component") cycles
(~Ifl,...,(ï~I)l) ~-o,...,k-I
and by the cycle product
~(7,7 t 1,...,7 f (k - 1)!).
~-~
To verify transitivity, first note that if w- 1 belongs to an orbit, then
all elements that are moved by the component cycle ( 1, ..., l) belong to the
same orbit. "Chis follows from considering compositions of cycles. Similarly,
examining powers of the cycle product, it follows that if 1 belongs to an
orbit, 1} l, 1~- 2l, ... all belong to that orbit. Furthermore, all of these are
moved by one of the different component cycles, and repeated application of
those component cycles shows that for each such cycle all elements moved
by that cycle hPlrtng to the 4rbit of w - 1. Thus all elements belong to the
same orbit.
'I'o see that k observations suffice to learn !t, i.e. 3e;w such that Cl~,l - e,
note that each observation w removes those cycles from the set of remaining
generators that move that element. The first observation therefore removes
one component cycle and the cycle product. There are only k - 1 cycles left
that form the generators of Gw. Then simply pick the remaining k- 1 obser-
vations from different component cycles such that each of those observations
eliminates one of those cycles from the set of remaining generators.
Finally, observe that k- 1(or (ewer) observations are insufficient for
learning S2 because there are k component cycles and each observation re-
moves at most one component cycle from the set of generators. t7
Intuitively, in the construction used in the proof we are stacking mul-
tiple identical cycles on top of each other, then we allow each cycle to be
independently rotated and in addition we rotate the stack of cycles. This
construction can be rnodified to obtain further classes of groups that permit
k-step learning. Simply replace the component l-cycles by other permutation
groups that move only the same I-elements.
9 Relation to the Literature
The problem of language learning, structure in language and creative use
of language are relatively new in economics. Closest in spirit to the present
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paper is probably Rubinstein [1996] who is concerned with the structure of
binary relations appearing in natural language. Like us, he has as one of
his premises that "evolutionary forces make it more likely that the `optimal'
structures are observed (...]." He argues for certain properties that make
binary relations in language more useful; among them the facility with which
nameless elements in a set can be indicated, which reminds one of creative
language use. }ie finds that this criterion of "indication-friendliness" is only
satisfied by linear orderings.
For linguists of course, the questions of structure in language and how
language is learned are central. Noam Chomsky's research agenda for ex-
ample attempts to identify a universal language faculty, a"generative gram-
mar." Such a grammar would account for the fact that apparently relatively
few observations suffice to learn a language that is capable of generating
expressions of infinitely many meanings, in particular novel expressions that
have not been encountered before. Thus viewed, the generative grammar
accounts for creative language use (e.g. Chomsky [1988]).
Within economics there is recent work by Segal [1996] that is related to
ours. }fe starts with a common language but assumes that players cannot
use the language to deduce a way of playing a coordination game. Instead
they communicate with their common language within some organizational
form. His objective is to determine the optimal organizational form (pro-
tocol, mechanism), where the likely quality of the communication outcome
is traded ofi against a measure of communication complexity. Like in the
present paper and in Rubinstein's work the focus is on characterizing ef-
ficient structures (protocols), and players are assumed to attain common
knowledge of the structure via prior exposure to similar coordination prob-
lems. Segal shows that coordination by authority performs well in a wide
range of circumstances and alludes to the possibility of using models of this
kind to think of organizations aa incomplete contracts.
Two other recent papers examine how coordination is afíected or aided
by structure. Chwe [1996] examines how structure affects collective action.
In Chwe's model individuals share a common interest in coordinating col-
lective action but have to rely on social networks to spread information
about each individual's readiness to participate in collective action. The
form of the network determines the speed at which information travels, the
likelihood of collective action, and the time spent until collective action is
achieved. Calvert [1991] considers Crawford and Haller's "learning to coor-
dinate" paradigm under constantly changing conditions. He declares that
"[...] the basic problem of social order involves the achievement of coor-
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dination in fundamentally new situations [...~," and points out the benefit
to players who make use of the "common-knowledge environment" of the
games.
10 Conclusion
Organizations conduct their activity in the face of a continually changing
environment. It is in the very nahire oI novel challenges to an organization
that adequate responses often have to be devised "on the spot." The mem-
bers of the organization then face a chronic coordination problem and are
likely to make use of any common knowledge structure that facilitates solu-
tion of novel coordination problems. This paper shows that such common
knowledge structures may be of great value even ii the coordination problems
faced are characterized by absence of a common language. We can imagine
these common knowledge structures as being established through tepeated
confrontations with novel but similar problems. One can perhaps think of
organizations partially as reservoirs oi such common knowledge structures.
A successful organization is then one whose repertoire of common knowledge
structures is better adapted to the changing nature of its environment.
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